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The Prosecutor's Function in Sentencing
Dan K. Webb*
Scott F. Turow**
INTRODUCTION
In the federal system, the prosecutor is only one of the actors
called upon to take part in the sentencing process. While the ulti-
mate power over sentencing belongs to the district court judge,1
* United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois. J.D. 1970, Loyola University of
Chicago.
** Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Illinois. B.A. 1970, Amherst
College; M.A. 1974, Stanford University; J.D. 1978, Harvard University.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Gary Nurkin of the Chicago-Kent College
of Law, Chicago, Illinois, who made substantial contributions toward the research of this
article.
1. FzD. R. Cium. P. 32(a) provides:
(a) Sentence
(1) Imposition of Sentence. Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable
delay. Before imposing sentence the court shall afford counsel an opportunity to
speak on behalf of the defendant and shall address the defendant personally
and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to present
any information in mitigation of punishment. The attorney for the government
shall have an equivalent opportunity to speak to the court.
(2) Notification of Right to Appeal. After imposing sentence in a case which has
gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise the defendant of his
right to appeal and of the right of a person who is able to pay the cost of an
appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. There shall be no duty on
the court to advise the defendant of any right of appeal after sentence is im-
posed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. If the defendant so requests,
the clerk of the court shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal on
behalf of the defendant.
See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (where sentence imposed by
district court judge was reversed and remanded because two prior convictions which the
judge had considered in imposing sentence on the defendant were unconstitutional. The
court, however, noted that generally a trial judge in the federal system has wide discretion
in determining what sentence to impose and that the sentence is generally unreviewable if it
falls within statutory limits); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1980)
(where codefendants each received different length sentences after being convicted on the
same counts of conspiracy and distribution of drugs, the sentence disparity was not im-
proper because the sentencing judge had wide discretion in determining what sentences to
impose); United States v. Main, 598 F.2d 1086, 1094 (7th Cir. 1979) (if sentence imposed is
within the limits dictated by statute, the sentence is not subject to appellate review unless
the sentencing judge relied on improper or unreliable information).
See also Hoffman, Plea Bargaining and the Role of the Judge, 53 F.R.D. 499 (1971);
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the court's probation service,2 the defendant's counsel,3 and the
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 18-1.1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]. Section
18-1.1 provides:
Abolition of jury sentencing
Sentencing involves a judicial function, and the jury's role should not therefore
extend to the determination of the appropriate sentence. These standards do not
deal with whether the death penalty should be an available sentencing alternative
and, if so, who should participate in its imposition.
2. FED. R. CuM. P. 32(c) provides:
(c) Presentence Investigation
(1) When Made. The probation service of the court shall make a presentence
investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the
granting of probation unless, with the permission of the court, the defendant
waives a presentence investigation and report, or the court finds that there is in
the record information sufficient to enable the meaningful exercise of sentencing
discretion, and the court explains this finding on the record.
The report shall not be submitted to the court or its contents disclosed to
anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or has been
found guilty, except that a judge may, with the written consent of the defen-
dant, inspect a presentence report at any time.
(2) Report. The report of the presentence investigation shall contain any prior
criminal record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics,
his financial condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be
helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional
treatment of the defendant, and such other information as may be required by
the court.
(3) Disclosure.
(A) Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the defen-
dant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the
presentence investigation exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence,
but not to the extent that in the opinion of the court the report contains
diagnostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilita-
tion, sources of information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or
any other information which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or
otherwise, to the defendant or other persons; and the court shall afford the
defendant or his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon and, at the
discretion of the court, to introduce testimony or other information relating
to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the presentence report.
(B) If the court is of the view that there is information in the presentence
report which should not be disclosed under subdivision (c)(3)(A) of this
rule, the court in lieu of making the report or part thereof available shall
state orally or in writing a summary of the factual information contained
therein to be relied on in determining sentence, and shall give the defendant
or his counsel an opportunity to comment thereon. The statement may be
made to the parties in camera.
(C) Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall also be dis-
closed to the attorney for the government.
(D) Any copies of the presentence investigation report made available to the
defendant or his counsel and the attorney for the government shall be re-
turned to the probation officer immediately following the imposition of sen-
tence or the granting of probation, unless the court, in its discretion other-
wise directs.
1982] Prosecutor's Function in Sentencing
defendant himself' submit information and recommendations
which commonly have a significant impact on the disposition the
judge sees fit to impose. In addition to the important role played
by these participants, the prosecutor's involvement in the sentenc-
ing process also often contributes significantly to the final result.
The prosecutor, for example, is customarily called upon to submit
a written statement for the probation service's presentence investi-
gation describing the government's view of the offense for which
the defendant has been convicted. This statement includes rele-
vant evidentiary details pertaining to the defendant's offense.6
(E) The reports of studies and recommendations contained therein made by
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the Parole Commission pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §§ 4205(c), 5010(e), or 5037(c) shall be considered a presentence
investigation within the meaning of subdivision (c)(3) of this rule.
See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 48 (1979). The district court judge considered
defendant's perjury in determining the length of defendant's prison sentence. In upholding
the sentence, the Supreme Court held that considering the defendant's untruthful character
was proper as it related to his ability to be rehabilitated. The Court also noted that most
jurisdictions employ probation officers to conduct extensive presentence investigations of
the defendant's life and character in order to compile presentence reports for the sentencing
judge.
See also Lambros, Plea Bargaining and the Sentencing Process, 53 F.R.D. 506, 511
(1971) (discussion of the probation officer's role in sentencing) [hereinafter cited as Lam-
bros]; STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 18-6.9, which provides:
Judicial Restraint
Although the sentencing court may appropriately take into consideration the de-
fendant's admission of guilt or assistance given the prosecution in some circum-
stances, it is inappropriate for the court to take the initiative in seeking to obtain
such a confession or to induce cooperation with the prosecution. Similarly, al-
though it is desirable that the sentencing court request the parties and the proba-
tion officer to provide it with additional information where the sentencing record
appears incomplete or potentially inaccurate, the court shall not undertake its
own investigation absent extraordinary circumstances or otherwise consider alle-
gations of misconduct by the defendant not present in the sentencing record.
3. FED. R. CRaM. P. 32(a)(1). See Alachuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bar-
gaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975).
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1). See also Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961). After
serving seven years of a 25 year prison term, the petitioner filed a motion to vacate his
sentence on the ground that he had not been permitted to speak in his own behalf prior to
sentencing, as required by FED. R. CraM. P. 32(a)(1), but that his counsel had spoken for
him. The Supreme Court held that although the requirement could not be fulfilled merely
by allowing defendant's counsel to speak, in this case the defendant had not been denied
the opportunity to speak. The Court pointed out that to avoid future litigation, trial judges
should unambiguously invite the defendant to speak on his own behalf before sentencing.
5. See Alschuler, The Prosecutors' Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. RaV. 50
(1968). See also E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, Pmiucnum OF CRiMINOLOGY 377 (1955).
6. FED. R. CraM. P. 32(c)(2). See STANDAmS, supra note 1, at §§ 18-6.7, 18-6.3(d). Sec-
tion 18-6.7 provides:
Record
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Moreover, the prosecutor, as government counsel, is afforded an
(a) As in the case of all other proceedings in open court, a record of the sentenc-
ing proceeding should be made and preserved in such a manner that it can be
transcribed as needed. The following items should be available for inclusion in
the transcription:
(i) a verbatim account of the entire sentencing proceeding, including a record
of any statements made in aggravation or mitigation made by the defendant,
the defense attorney, and the prosecuting attorney, together with any testimony
received of witnesses on matters relevant to the sentence and any statements by
the court explaining the sentence;
(ii) a verbatim account of such parts of the trial on the issue of guilt, or the
proceedings leading to the acceptance of a plea, as are relevant to the sentenc-
ing decision;
(iii) copies of the presentence report and any other documents or reports
available to the sentencing court as an aid in passing sentence. The part of the
record containing such reports or documents should be subject to examination
by the parties to the extent provided in standards 18-5.3 and 18-5.4. The record
should reveal what parts of such reports or documents have been revealed to the
parties and by what method such disclosure was made. It should also contain
any record of a presentence conference held in accordance with standard 18-
5.5(b).
(b) Adequate resources should be provided to the court so as to permit the
transmission of relevant dispositional information to the prison authorities in the
event of a commitment. If the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment for a maxi-
mum term in excess of one year, the court should be required to forward to the
prison authorities a copy of the items described in standard 18-6.7(a)(iii) and a
verbatim transcript of the proceeding described in standard 18-6.6. The court
should also be authorized and encouraged to forward any other part of the record
which is deemed relevant to the defendant's classification and treatment.
Section 18-6.3(d) provides:
Duties of counsel
(d) The duties of the prosecutor with respect to each specific sentence should
include the following steps:
(i) The prosecutor should satisfy himself or herself that the factual basis for
the sentence will be both adequate and accurate, and that the record of the
sentencing proceeding will accurately reflect circumstances of the offense and
characteristics of the defendant which were not disclosed during the guilt phase
of the case:
(A) If the prosecutor has access to the presentence report, the prosecutor
should measure it against information at his or her disposal in order to be
able to amplify parts which do not sufficiently reveal matters which are rele-
vant to a proper sentence. The prosecutor should also take proper steps to
controvert any inaccuracies in the report in accordance with the procedure
specified in standard 18-5.5(b). The first such step should normally involve
an attempt to avoid the formal production of evidence in open court by
reaching an informal agreement with the defense attorney and -the probation
officer; or
(B) If the prosecutor does not have access to the presentence report, the
prosecutor should present at the sentencing hearing those facts at his or her
disposal which are relevant to a proper sentence. Such presentation should
also be preceded by the notice contemplated by standard 18-5.5(b) in order
that new allegations may be verified by the probation officer;
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opportunity to address the court at the time of sentencing as a
matter of statutory right.7 At that time, the prosecutor will often
make a recommendation to the court regarding the government's
view of the case's appropriate disposition.8
The prosecutor's recommendation to the court represents the
culmination of his function in the sentencing process. Following
conviction, however, the prosecutor does not necessarily recom-
mend incarceration in all cases; few prosecutors are so hardened as
to believe that all convicted defendants must be subjected to
(ii) Reasonably prior to the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor should dis-
close to the defense and to the court through the probation officer all information
in the prosecutor's files which is favorable to the defendant on the sentencing
issue;
(iii) If a plea was the result of plea discussion or an agreement which included a
position on the sentence, the prosecutor should disclose its terms to the court;
(iv) If the prosecutor should determine whether there are grounds for the impo-
sition of a special term based on particular characteristics of the defendant (stan-
dards 18-2.5(b) and 18-4.4). If the prosecutor finds such grounds, he or she should
cause the notice contemplated by standard 18-6.5(b)(i) to be served on the defen-
dant and defense attorney. The prosecutor may then prepare a factual case for
presentation at the sentencing proceeding.
Cf. United States v. Miller, 495 F.2d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 1974) (judicial decision as to what
portions of prosecutor's presentence report to disclose to defendant would be determined on
a case by case basis. In general, the district court should disclose any criteria in the report
which was considered for sentencing, and should advise defendants of any material portions
of the presentence report); United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1119-21 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970) (prosecutor's report to the court concerning the defendant must
be disclosed with appropriate safeguards to defense counsel prior to the defendant's
sentencing).
7. FED. R. CriM. P. 32(a)(1). See 121 CONG. Rac. 23325 (daily ed. July 17, 1975) (remarks
of Sen. McClellan). See also United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 455 (7th Cir. 1980).
8. Where a case has been resolved by a guilty plea, this recommendation by the govern-
ment as to sentence often becomes a critical element of a plea agreement between the gov-
ernment and the defendant.
See Fir. R. CraM. P. 11(e)(1) and infra text accompanying notes 62-85. F. R. CatM. P.
11(e)(1) provides:
(e) Plea agreement procedure.
(1) In general. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the
defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions
with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to lesser or related of-
fense, the attorney for the government will do any of the following.
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's
request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such
recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of
the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
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lengthy prison sentences. Instead, recommendations as to disposi-
tion vary with each case. A variety of considerations contribute to
the prosecutor's final recommendation.
The purpose of this article is to outline the sentencing considera-
tions presently followed by one prosecutor's office, the office of the
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. These
considerations play a critical part in determining the recommenda-
tions which are submitted to the court at the time of sentencing.
This article will first discuss matters of policy and philosophy per-
tinent to the criminal justice system which affect our sentencing
recommendations. Next, the article will examine sentencing con-
siderations which arise from various practical needs of the criminal
justice system. The discussion in this portion of the article will
concern, in part, the effect of the defendant's guilty plea or his
cooperation in other investigations in arriving at sentencing recom-
mendations. Finally, because most of the cases which we prosecute
are resolved by guilty pleas,e and because there is the greatest flex-
ibility in our posture before a case has gone to trial,10 the article
will analyze the positions we assume regarding disposition in the
course of trying to reach a plea agreement.
Before beginning, however, a few caveats are in order. Much of
what is said here is simply a matter of observation and experience.
As a consequence, the opinions expressed in this article are subjec-
tive, with all the limitations that implies. Moreover, while it is
likely that a number of the sentencing considerations outlined here
in a federal context are commonly applied by other prosecutors,
the differences between federal and state laws on sentencing and
plea negotiating may render part of what follows inapplicable in
other jurisdictions."' Indeed, the statements made in this article do
9. In 1980, for example, charges were filed against 685 defendants in 433 cases, and ap-
proximately 410 defendants pleaded guilty. 1980 REPORT, UNITED STATES ATrORNEY, NORTH-
ERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 9 [hereinafter cited as 1980 REPORT].
10. Compare Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978) (recognition of the
need for wide prosecutorial discretion during plea bargaining) with Corbett v. New Jersey,
439 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1978) (recognition that a proper degree of leniency may be extended in
return for a guilty plea).
11. Under Illinois law, for example, trial judges are free to take part in discussions lead-
ing towards a guilty plea. ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, 113-4(c) (1981). In the federal system,
district court judges are forbidden from participating is such discussions, FaD. R. CrM. P.
11(e)(1), a prohibition which is strictly enforced. See, e.g., Toler v. Wyrick, 563 F.2d 372
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978) (court noted that while judicial participa-
tion in plea bargaining was prohibited in federal court, it was not strictly prohibited in
Missouri state courts. Under Missouri law, judicial participation did not in and of itself
render a plea involuntary, but was merely one factor to consider in examining the voluntari-
[Vol. 13646
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not reflect rules of uniform and unyielding applicability even in
our own jurisdiction. In that vein, it should be emphasized that the
following remarks about sentencing considerations are not in-
tended to provide any final assurance to defendants or their law-
yers in their encounters with our office. What we intend is merely a
portrayal of the variety of concerns, ranging from matters of policy
and philosophy to systemic and practical needs, which often tend
to influence a prosecutor's view of the appropriate punishment in a
case.
POLICY CONCERNS
As every lawyer knows, the result in each case is determined by
its own facts. The same is true of sentencing and sentencing rec-
ommendations.12 Variables such as the severity of the offense for
which the defendant was convicted, the extent of his participation
in the crime," and the presence of factors relating to his personal
ness of a plea); United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 431 F. Supp. 1115, 1116
(N.D. IMI. 1977) ("Rule 11 implicitly recognized that participation in the plea bargaining
process depreciates the image of the trial judge that is necessary to public confidence in the
impartial and objective administration of criminal justice."). As a result of the difference in
approach between state and federal laws, the defendant who enters a guilty plea in the
Illinois system may be able to do so with substantially greater assurance that the prosecu-
tor's recommendation will be followed by the court than would be the case if he were plead-
ing guilty in federal court.
But see STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 14-3.3(f); Lambros, supra note 2, at 523; Lefstein,
Plea Bargaining and the Trial Judge, The New ABA Standards, and the Need to Control
Judicial Discretion, 59 N.C.L. Rgv. 477 (1980). Section 14-3.3(f) of the STANDARDS provides:
Responsibilities of the judge
... (0 All discussions at which the judge is present relating to plea agreements
should be recorded verbatim and preserved, except that for good cause the judge
may order the transcript of proceedings to be sealed. Such discussions should be
held in open court unless good cause is present for the proceedings to be held in
chambers. Except as otherwise provided in this standard, the judge should never
through word or demeanor, either directly or indirectly, communicate to the de-
fendant or defense counsel that a plea agreement should be accepted or that a
guilty plea should be entered.
In passing, the authors would note that they and many other federal prosecutors believe
that rule 11's prohibition on a judicial role in plea negotiations merits reconsideration.
Without doubting the rule's good intentions, it has added an element of uncertainty to plea
negotiations which has substantially hampered effective plea bargaining in the federal
courts since the prohibition was adopted by way of an amendment to rule 11 in 1975. 89
Stat. 371, 372 (1975).
12. See, e.g., Lambros, supra note 2, at 510-11. See also Glueck, The Sentencing Prob-
lem, 20 FFD. PRoB. 4, 15 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Glueck].
13. The extent of the defendant's participation in the crime is determined both over the
course of time and as relative to collaborators.
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history ' all commonly play some part in the deliberations of those
involved in the sentencing process."5
Concomitantly, certain broad concerns, which can be labeled
matters of philosophy or policy, apply in virtually every sentencing
with which we deal. Three concerns sought to be achieved through
or reflected in our sentencing recommendations are: the deterrence
of future criminal acts, the minimizing of sentence disparities, and
the incorporation of community values in, the sentence. These
three concerns are particularly prominent for a prosecutor because
they correspond to three primary aspects of his role: as a law en-
forcement official concerned with the prevention of crime, as a gov-
ernmental representative charged with ensuring evenhanded and
impartial application of the laws, and as a legal advocate appearing
on behalf of the citizens of his district.
Deterrence
While the criminal justice system is typically seen as serving a
variety of ends, including rehabilitation of offenders1 ' and provid-
ing for retribution on behalf of an aggrieved community,1 7 from a
14. Relevant personal factors include a past criminal background, present employment,
health, past achievements, and family circumstance.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (consideration of defendant's
untruthful character proper because it indicated his ability to.be rehabilitated); Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (upholding New York statute allowing the trial judge to
consider information about the convicted person's past life, health, habits, conduct, and
mental and moral propensities); United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974)
(trial judge properly considered the defendant's character when imposing sentence). See
also Lambros, supra note 2, at 517.
16. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Retribution is no longer
the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."); Green v. United States, 481 F.2d
1140, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Rehabilitation is certainly a salient goal of the criminal justice
system, but a recently convicted offender is not always the best judge of the optimum path
to rehabilitation."). See also United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978); STANDARDS,
supra note 1, at § 18-3.2(a)(v); Lambros, supra note 2, at 511. Section 18-3.2(a)(v) of the
STANDARDS provides:
Sentencing principles: general criteria
(a) Both the guideline drafting agency in specifying presumptive ranges and the
sentencing court in imposing sentence should be guided in exercising their discre-
tion by the following principles:
(v) The offender's need for rehabilitation or treatment should not be consid-
ered as a justification for imposing restraints in excess of those clearly justified
on other grounds. Consistent with this standard, however, participation in a
specified program may be made a condition of probation, and the offender's
need for special treatment may supply a reason for imposing a nonincarcera-
tive sentencing alternative.
17. See H.L.A. HART, PumSHMEr AND REsP'Nsmmnrrv 8-10, 23-27 (1969) [herein-
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prosecutor's perspective probably the single most important func-
tion of the system is to prevent further crime. The idea of deter-
rence is perhaps foremost among the general concerns which a
prosecutor brings with him to the sentencing process. In general,
we tend to encourage the courts to impose sentences which have
both a "specific" and "general" deterrent effect,18 that is, sentences
which will discourage, respectively, the defendant himself and
others similarly situated from engaging in the future in the same
conduct for which the defendant has been convicted. 1'
This concern with deterrence is particularly appropriate in light
of the crimes with whose prosecution our office is principally con-
cerned. In the Northern District of Illinois, well-organized and ef-
fective State's Attorney's offices operate in each of the constituent
counties. The State's Attorney's offices generally have jurisdiction
over most crimes of violence and most crimes against property. In
contrast, our primary emphasis falls on those crimes which require
investigative resources that the state criminal justice system can-
not easily spare in light of the volume of criminal activity with
which it is required to deal. Within this area of crime requiring
detailed investigation, our office has devoted a major part of its
attention for some years 0 to the prosecution of relatively select
categories of crime: corruption of public officials, frauds against the
government," complex fraud schemes," income tax violations,
and major narcotics offenses."3 All of these categories share the
common characteristic of being what might be called contempla-
tive offenses. Contemplative offenses are crimes in which defen-
dants are typically thought to have weighed the possible economic
benefits of their law breaking conduct against the risk of detection
after cited as H.L.A. HART]; H. PACKR, LaMrrs oF THE CIMNAL SANCTION 37-38 (1968)
[hereinfter cited as H. PACKER].
18. See J. BENTHAM, THE RATiONALE OF PUNISHNw 19-21 (1836) [hereinafter cited as J.
BameHAm]; H.L.A. HART, supra note 17, at 128-29; H. PAcIMn, supra note 17, at 39-48.
19. Closely related to the concept of specific and general deterrence is the idea of deten-
tion. Detention is used as a means of preventing crime by those whose history of recidivism
indicates that they are a continuing danger to the community. See J. BmrNHAM, supra note
18, at 19-21; H. PACKER, supra note 17, at 48-53.
20. See, e.g., 1975-1980 REPORms, UNrI) STATas ATroR, Y, Nomm DuSRcIr OF ILu-
NOIS [hereinafter cited as 19 - Rpoirr for the pertinent year].
21. This type of case typically involves an attempt to obtain undeserved benefits or pay-
ments from a federal entitlement program.
22. Complex fraud schemes involve advance fee frauds, franchise swindles, and commod-
ities boilerrooms.
23. Major narcotics offenses usually involve those who traffick in significant quantities of
drugs for large profit.
1982]
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and the possible penalties."'
The calculation involved in contemplative offenses tends to en-
hance the possible deterrent effect of sentences imposed. Assuming
that a prospective offender balances the benefits of his act against
the potential criminal penalties for the act, the more sure he is of
receiving a severe penalty if apprehended, the less likely he will be
to commit the crime. Therefore, as a general practice, without dis-
allowing the possibility that a variety of mitigating factors may
counsel other results, we tend to recommend prison sentences in
these cases.
Fairness
As we have already indicated, the unique facts of each case inev-
itably control the result in sentencing.25 The emphasis placed on
these variables may account for the fact that persons who are con-
victed of the same offense may receive quite different sentences. A
further explanation for the degree of variation in sentencing is that
judges in whose sound discretion sentencing is committed, have
different philosophies of and outlooks toward sentencing.26 In the
Northern District of Illinois, for example, there are thirteen federal
district court judges on active status who hear criminal cases, as
well as a number of senior judges who hear these cases on occasion.
Normally, all of these judges impose sentences in the criminal
cases they have heard.
It is fundamental to a system of justice in a democracy, however,
that to the greatest extent practicable like cases be treated alike."7
In keeping with this principle, it is a concern of all those involved
in the sentencing process that unwarranted disparities in sentences
be minimized.' 8 It is a special concern of the United States Attor-
24. See PREsmENT's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JusTicE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 17-18 (1967); H.L.A. HART, supra note 17, at 133-34; H.
PACKER, supra note 17, at 354-59. See also Hoffman, Purposes and Philosophy of Sentenc-
ing, 75 F.R.D. 287, 316-17 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hoffman, Sentencing].
25. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
26. See Hoffman, Sentencing, supra note 24, at 503-04; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law
Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 406, 409 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Lumbard]. Cf. E. GREEN, JUDI-
cLL ATrrrfuxs TowARD SENTENCING 67-71 (1961) (contains a statistical study of purported
sentencing disparities).
27. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 17, at 24-25, 172-73; J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60
(1971); Lumbard, supra note 26, at 409.
28. See Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIH. L. Rzv. 1, 4-6, 20-22 (1972);
Glueck, supra note 12, at 15 (1956); Hoffman, Sentencing, supra note 24, at 290, 314-15. In
the Northern District of Illinois a sentencing council exists in which many of the judges
participate so as to share their views on sentencing.
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ney, because our office, unlike individual judges or defendants, is
involved in virtually every federal sentencing which takes place in
the district. To ensure that uniform standards are applied in deter-
mining, sentencing recommendations, those recommendations are
always a matter of consultation within our office. It is our policy
that each Assistant United States Attorney confer with the chief of
his division 2  before making a sentencing recommendation on be-
half of the government. In addition, consultation with the United
States Attorney and the First Assistant United States Attorney on
sentencing recommendations is commonplace in cases where any
special factors are present.
Community Values
In addition to appearing before the court as a law enforcement
officer seeking to curtail crime, and as a governmental official dedi-
cated to equal enforcement of the law, the prosecutor appears as a
representative of the community which he serves. The constitu-
tional provision requiring that a defendant be tried in the district
where the crime was committed 0 seems to reflect a variety of con-
cerns on the part of the constitutional framers. One such concern,
perhaps, was a desire to provide an assurance to the community in
which the crime has occurred that the system of justice is operat-
ing to seek out and, if appropriate, to punish those who have
wronged the residents of that locale and, by extension, the commu-
nity itself.3' Those of us involved in the criminal justice system
29. The United States Attorney's Office has three divisions engaged in criminal prosecu-
tions. Each division typically has responsibility for certain categories of offenses. The Crimi-
nal Receiving and Appellate Division is generally responsible for prosecution of immigration
offenses, postal thefts, and bank thefts. The Criminal Litigation Division is involved princi-
pally in prosecutions for narcotics offenses, complex frauds, income tax violations, and inter-
state transportation of stolen property. The Special Prosecutions Division typically handles
cases involving official corruption and governmental frauds. Because like cases are generally
concentrated within the divisions, consultation with the division chiefs will ordinarily assure
some measure of uniformity in our sentencing recommendations.
30. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .. " See also U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, which provides in pertinent part: "The Trial of all Crimes... shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed. .. ."
The constitutional requirement that a defendant be tried in the community where the
crime was committed stems primarily from the framers' desire to protect the accused from
trial in a hostile environment. C. WmRGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDUE §
301 (1969). See also United States v. Means, 409 F. Supp. 115, 117 (D. N.D. 1976).
31. See Travis v. United States, 363 U.S. 631, 634 (1961); Armour Packing Co. v. United
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perhaps at times pay less heed than we should to the fact that this
system plays a significant part in maintaining a community's sense
of shared values and its most deeply held ideas of right and
wrong.32
The events in court concerning the defendant are of great inter-
est in the community, even to those community members who have
no direct relation to the criminal or to the crime; the constant pub-
lic attention focused on the criminal courts through daily news
coverage and in the dramas of literature, television, and the thea-
tre suggest as much. The public spectacle of accusation, proof, re-
joinder, decision, and, if called for, punishment, can be viewed as a
form of a continuing morality play by which the community is as-
sured of an ongoing vigilance to those minimal standards of con-
duct which we have together decided are required to maintain the
social fabric. Under this view, the criminal justice system provides
for punishment not simply as a means of visiting retribution on
wrongdoers, or isolating them from the community, or even deter-
ring such conduct in the future. It does so also as a means of al-
lowing the community to join together in condemning misconduct
and, perhaps most important, of assuring the members of the com-
munity who have resisted the impulses of violence and self-interest
which commonly lead to crime, that their society values law-abid-
ing behavior. In this light, some of the common citizen complaints
about the "softness" of the criminal justice system3 3 can be under-
stood as not being always an expression of anger, bred of anxiety
or even brutal impulses, as the complaints are sometimes inter-
preted,"' but as a demand from community members that the af-
firmative values underlying their own acts of self-restraint con-
States, 209 U.S. 56, 76 (1908).
32. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 17, at 169-72.
33. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Robb, J., dissent-
ing); STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 18-2.5(C)(ii); Letter from Katherine F. Denehy to Mau-
rice J. Tobin, reprinted in J. W~rr, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 147-48 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as J. WHITE]. Section 18-2.5(c)(ii) of the STANDARDS provides:
Total confinement
(c) A sentence not involving total confinement is to be preferred in the absence of
affirmative reasons to the contrary. Examples of legitimate reasons for the selection of
total confinement in a given case are:
(ii) Confinement is necessary so as not to unduly depreciate the seriousness
of the offense and thereby foster disrespect for the law.
34. See J. WHr, supra note 33, at 128; Halpern, Notes from Our Gulag, NATION, July 4,
1981.
[Vol. 13
Prosecutor's Function in Sentencing
tinue to be respected.3 5 In the end, then, our system of criminal
justice aspires to dignify the behavior of those who obey the law. 6
For a prosecutor, the concern that sentencing recommendations
"reflect a current community consensus about the relative gravity
of offenses '3 7 is never wholly set aside in his deliberations.
Whatever mitigating factors exist, the prosecutor must always pay
some attention to whether the result he suggests to the court is
consistent with the community's interest in maintaining its own
values through the operation of the criminal justice system.
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS
As we have discussed, considerations which influence a prosecu-
tor's recommendations at the time of sentencing may relate to per-
ceived goals of the criminal justice system: deterrence, procedural
fairness, and reinforcement of community values. Beyond these
considerations, the efficiency of the operation of the criminal jus-
tice system itself can often be influenced, or even enhanced, by the
prosecutor's recommendations regarding disposition. Thus, either
the need to apprehend others involved in a crime or resource con-
straints may dictate sentencing concessions for those who, respec-
tively, cooperate against their criminal partners s or plead guilty.3 9
In addition, deference to the role of others involved in the sentenc-
ing process, particularly to the district court judge, may also have
some impact on the form of sentencing recommendations. This
section of the article will attempt to set forth the considerations
relating to cooperation, guilty pleas, and deference to the judiciary
that commonly influence our sentencing recommendations.
Cooperation
Because the crimes our office commonly prosecutes are fre-
35. See, e.g., J. WHIm, supra note 33, at 147-48.
36. This aspect of the sentencing process is not entirely unrecognized. See, e.g., STAN-
DARDS, supra note 1, at § 18-3.1(c)(iv).
37. STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 18-3.1(c)(iv), provides in pertinent part
Sentencing guidelines should seek to reflect a current consensus about the relative
gravity of offenses. In order to achieve proportionality among offenses, the guide-
line drafting agency should. . . seek to construct a normative ranking of offenses
consistent with contemporary community attitudes.... Periodic review of any
such offense severity scale in light of changing societal values should also be
required.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
39, See infra text accompanying notes 45-52.
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quently sophisticated, 40 they often involve the knowing participa-
tion of more than one person. Effective law enforcement and prin-
ciples of equity demand that all persons responsible for a crime be
held accountable for it. Accordingly, accommodations in sentenc-
ing recommendations are very often made in our office for those
defendants who are willing to aid the government in apprehending
their collaborators in crime.41 This is particularly true when the
criminal activity of persons more culpable than the defendant is
exposed. A defendant may render assistance to the government ei-
ther by testifying against co-conspirators or by furnishing other
material aid to investigators.
But to many, particularly lay people, negotiations between the
prosecutor and the cooperating defendant are unpalatable. There
is no doubt that a principled argument can be made against the
practice of sentencing concessions in this context: the practice re-
wards criminals merely for doing what the obligations of good citi-
zenship demand4 and, given the circumstances, the defendant's in-
formation may even be unreliable. Despite these sometimes
disquieting arguments, however, few prosecutors ever see fit to
40. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
41. To some extent, concessions in sentencing recommendations are warranted by the
fact that a willingness to cooperate may bear on a defendant's amenability to rehabilitation.
The view has been frequently expressed that a willingness to cooperate is some sign of a
defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the dictates of law in the future. See, e.g.,
Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1980) (petitioner's refusal to cooperate with
a governmental investigation into a conspiracy with which he was admittedly involved was a
proper factor to consider in imposing sentence because it indicated a lack of reform); STAN-
DARDS, supra note 1, at § 18-2.2; Lumbard, supra note 26, at 413-14.
42. In Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980), Justice Powell noted:
Concealment of crime has been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's
duty to 'raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the authorities,' Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972), was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at
least as early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 101-
02 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see Statute of Westminster Second, 13, Edw. 1,
chs. 1, 4, and 6, pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States en-
acted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone who, 'having knowledge
of the actual commission of [certain felonies], shall conceal, and not as soon as
may be disclosed and make known the same to [the appropriate authority] . . . '
Act of Apr. 30, 1970, ch. 9, § 6, 1 Stat. 113. Although the term 'misprison of felony'
now has an archaic ring, gross indifference to the duty to report known criminal
behavior remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship .... This deeply rooted so-
cial obligation is not diminished when the witness to crime is involved in illicit
activities himself. Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against self-in-
crimination,. . . the criminal defendant no less than any other citizen is obliged
to assist the authorities. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 557-58.
Prosecutor's Function in Sentencing
abandon the practice of modifying sentencing positions on behalf
of those who provide valuable cooperation, because there are few
situations in which prosecutors believe it is well-advised to allow
other guilty persons to go unprosecuted.
On the other hand, service to the larger principles of the crimi-
nal justice system requires that sentencing concessions accorded to
the cooperating individual be tempered. With this limitation in
mind, our office consistently tries to avoid situations in which the
cooperating defendant is allowed to go without significant punish-
ment for his involvement in criminal activity.'3
While a defendant's willingness to cooperate may lead to conces-
sions in a sentencing recommendation, a failure to cooperate in sit-
uations where the defendant obviously possesses valuable informa-
tion is inevitably a factor that contributes to a more severe
recommendation. This approach is consistent with the recognition
that a district court judge may validly consider a defendant's fail-
ure to cooperate as an aggravating factor in sentencing." Thus, the
same factors in the criminal justice system which require that co-
operation be rewarded compel the opposite result for those defen-
dants who choose not to tell what they know.
Guilty Pleas
In most jurisdictions there are not sufficient resources, in either
the judiciary or the prosecutor's office, to allow for the trial of
every criminal case brought before the court. The Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois is no exception. The number of indictments and
informations we return annually,'5 taken in combination with the
requirements of the federal Speedy Trial Act,' makes it likely that
if every criminal case went to trial no active judge could manage
the demands of his trial call. To remedy the shortages in resources
which would occur if all criminal cases went to trial, taxes would
have to be increased so as to provide funding for more judges,
prosecutors, and courthouses.
43. For example, we recently recommended that a former public official who had taken
approximately $300,000 in bribes be sentenced to a substantial period of incarceration, not-
withstanding his notable cooperation with the government in prosecuting those who bribed
him.
44. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 557-58 (1980); United States v. Dawson,
642 F.2d 1060, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1981) (when determining sentence, it is proper to give
weight to the defendant's failure to cooperate with the prosecution in naming his sources).
45. See supra note 9.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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The realities surrounding our present resources require, there-
fore, that defendants be offered incentives to plead guilty47 in or-
der to keep the number of criminal cases going to trial at a man-
ageable level. Guilty pleas, however, serve more than this practical
function. A guilty plea may often bespeak genuine remorse and
shame on a defendant's part for his conduct, a factor to which the
sentencing process should generally give some positive recogni-
tion.48 For the prosecutor, moreover, a guilty plea guarantees a
conviction, an assurance whose value cannot be freely discounted
given that juries on occasion return not guilty verdicts in cases in
which lawyers on both sides regard the evidence of guilt as clear-
cut.
For these reasons, our office is inclined to moderate sentencing
recommendations for those defendants who plead guilty. This
practice is common in all prosecutor's offices, and its permissibility
is well recognized by the courts.'9 At the same time, it goes without
saying that we earnestly attempt to avoid penalizing defendants
for asserting their right to trial. Thus, we moderate our recommen-
dations for guilty pleading defendants, rather than enhancing our
recommendations for defendants who go to trial.
Even with moderation, however, our allowances for guilty pleas
are seldom as substantial as those made in light of a defendant's
significant cooperation. For example, if there is a consensus in our
office that a defendant's crime and background justify a period of
incarceration, it is unlikely that a guilty plea will prompt a change
in our recommendation. We assume this stance for a number of
reasons. First, the gravity of bringing criminal charges against any
citizen dictates that extreme care be exercised in the decision to
seek an indictment. 50 Charges are filed only when the available evi-
dence suggests that our likelihood of establishing guilt at trial is
47. Lambros, supra note 2, at 509, 518-23.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 582 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978) (permissible to
consider defendant's lack of remorse in imposing one year and one day sentence for first
offense of forging a check); United States v. Biscoe, 518 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1975) (sentence
was not impermissibly inflated because the sentencing court took into account defendant's
lack of repentence during trial).
49. See supra notes 47-48.
50. An Assistant United States Attorney is required to present a lengthy memorandum
detailing all available evidence in any case in which he wishes to seek an indictment. The
memorandum is then ordinarily reviewed by a deputy chief of his division, the chief of his
division, the First Assistant United States Attorney, and the United States Attorney. Only
when the review process has been completed and a consensus reached on the need for an
indictment are charges presented to the grand jury.
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substantial.5' Notwithstanding the overall constraints on our re-
sources then, taken one by one, most guilty pleas do not promise a
result different from what we believe we can and should achieve in
court. Second, moderation in our sentencing concessions acknowl-
edges traditional judicial lenity toward guilty pleading defendants.
Judicial lenity results from a commonly expressed belief that a
guilty plea is a step toward rehabilitation," and because the pres-
entation of evidence at trial often presents to the judge a far more
graphic and disturbing portrayal of the defendant's alleged mis-
conduct than the bare prose of the prosecutor's version in the
presentence investigative report. In the end, these factors, as well
as the prosecutor's moderation in his recommendation, generally
yield more tempered dispositions for defendants who plead guilty.
Deference
The district court judge's authority over sentencing is one of the
most unique and awesome powers exercised by any member of the
American judiciary and probably by any governmental official in
the United States. Although the prosecutor submits recommenda-
tions to the court, the final determination of an individual of-
fender's sentence rests wholly within the sound discretion of the
district court judge." So long as the sentence imposed is within
statutory limits, this exercise of the court's discretion is seldom
disturbed on appeal."
51. In 1980, of the 140 defendants who went to trial in the Northern District of Illinois,
102 were found guilty. There were also 410 guilty pleas, yielding an overall conviction rate
exceeding 93%. 1980 REPoRT, supra note 9, at 9.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Mavrick, 601 F.2d 921, 931 n.11 (7th Cir. 1979) (affirming
sentence imposed by trial judge who could not in good conscience sentence the defendant to
probation because the defendant had not taken the "first step toward rehabilitation" by
admitting his guilt); Gardner v. Meyer, 519 F. Supp. 75, 83 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (proper for trial
judge to discount a defendant's sentence in return for a guilty plea, where such discount is
"based upon the trial court's view of the guilty plea as constituting an initial step in the
rehabilitation process"); Weatherington v. Wainright, 486 F. Supp. 934, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1979),
aff'd, 618 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980) (codefendant was justifiably given a substantially shorter
sentence in return for pleading guilty). But see Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
53. See United States v. Tucker, 424 U.S. 443 (1972); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d
1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Main, 598 F.2d 1086, 1094 (7th Cir. 1979).
54. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 443, 431 (1972) (once determination is made
that sentence imposed is within statutory limitations, appellate review is at an end so long
as there has been no use of inaccurate information or no abuse of discretion); United States
v. Main, 598 F.2d 1086, 1094 (7th Cir. 1979) (if sentence imposed is within the limits dic-
tated by statute, the sentence is not subject to appellate review unless the sentencing judge
relied on improper or unreliable information); United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 311-12
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The authority of the district court judge over sentencing is a
jealously guarded prerogative."5 This is partly due to the tradi-
tional responsibilities of the district court judge in the sentencing
process, but it is also necessary because of the sensitivity and
weightiness of the sentencing task. On the rare occasions when
judges have discussed the sentencing process," they have often de-
scribed it as one of the most difficult, and frequently painful parts
of their duties.57 The reasons for this are understandable. In decid-
ing to incarcerate an individual, the judge activates a sequence of
events of the gravest moral consequence. The defendant will be re-
moved from the comfort of family and friends, deprived of the
right to exercise any choice about most aspects of his daily con-
duct, and subjected to a deliberately punitive, though humane, en-
vironment. Conversely, the decision to leave at liberty a person
who has previously posed a threat to the well-being of the commu-
nity must often overcome powerful arguments in favor of
imprisonment.58
On a most human level, therefore, it is appropriate that other
participants in the sentencing process, no matter how strong their
feelings about the appropriate outcome, show continued deference
toward the court's sentencing deliberations and decision. Whether
the defendant is incarcerated or allowed to remain at large, the
ultimate burden of either course of action rests upon the judge ex-
clusively. Consequently, our formulation of sentencing recommen-
dations and our practice in reaching guilty pleas are both deliber-
ately structured to reflect continuing deference to the sentencing
judge. The implementation of this procedure in our office will be
illustrated throughout the next section.
POLICY AND PRACTICE IN PLEA AGREEMENTS
The sentencing considerations thus far discussed are not wholly
harmonious with each other. For example, lessened sentences for
convicted persons who implicate their criminal partners is some-
what inconsistent with the idea of deterrence and even, perhaps,
(7th Cir. 1975) (district judge has wide sentencing discretion within statutory limits and
exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except on a plain showing of abuse).
55. See Hoffman, Sentencing, supra note 24, at 325.
56. See Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285 (1930).
57. See, e.g., Lambros, supra note 2, at 510; Lumbard, supra note 26, at 413-14.
58. Arguments favoring a prison term include a need for future deterrence, a desire for
retribution, and an opportunity for rehabilitation. See supra notes 16-19, 31-37 and accom-
panying text.
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the principle of treating like cases alike. As a result, balances must
be struck in arriving at sentencing recommendations. Of course, no
precise formula for such weighing and counter-weighing can be de-
vised. But it is possible to detail how sentencing factors play
against each other in the process of formulating recommendations.
These factors will be described in the context of plea negotiations,
where they are all often present.
Rule 11 and the Form of Typical Plea Agreements
Plea agreements commonly entered into by the United States
Attorney's Office are governed by rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 11 essentially permits three forms of
plea bargains: 1) agreements by which the government undertakes
to dismiss certain counts of the indictment," 2) agreements by
which the government promises to make certain advisory sentenc-
ing recommendations to the court,60 and 3) agreements which, with
the court's permission, determine in binding fashion the sentence
to be imposed.6"
Under any plea agreement, we deem it our obligation to fully
advise the court, both in the presentence investigation and at the
time of sentencing, of all factors concerning the crime and the de-
fendant's background which may act to mitigate or aggravate the
court's prospective sentence. This approach is followed because the
sentencing judge must be apprised of all relevant information. In
no circumstance does our office agree to soften or withhold adverse
information from the court concerning any defendant. Even where
counts are dropped as part of the plea agreement, the evidence rel-
evant to those counts is described for the court as part of our
presentence submission.
Dismissal of Counts
Under rule 11(e)(1)(A), the government and the defendant can
agree to a guilty plea on the condition that the government will
move to dismiss other counts"2 of the indictment. 3 Plea agree-
59. See infra text accompanying notes 62-70.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 79-85.
62. Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), on rehearing, 646 F.2d 902 (5th Cir.
1981). See Williams v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981) (prosecutor acted permissibly
in offering to dismiss three of five pending charges against the defendant, to reduce a fourth,
to recommend a shortened sentence if the defendant pled guilty, and to recommend a heav-
ier sentence and reindictment if he did not plead guilty); STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 14-
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ments of this nature require approval from the district court."
Generally, the number of counts which we are willing to dismiss is
related to the severity of the offense, e5 since dropping counts nec-
3.1(b)(iii).
Section 14-3.1(b)(iii) of the ABA STANDARDS provides:
Propriety of plea discussions and plea agreements
(b) The prosecuting attorney, in reaching a plea agreement, may agree to one or
more of the following, as dictated by the circumstances of the individual case:
(iii) to dismiss, to seek to dismiss, or not to oppose dismissal of other charges
or potential charges against the defendant if the defendant enters a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere.
63. Usually, to avoid having to re-indict in the event the plea bargain breaks down, the
government's motion to dismiss is not made until the time of sentencing when the convic-
tion is formally entered.
64. FED. R. CiuM. P. 11(e)(2) provides:
(e) Plea agreement procedure.
(2) Notice of such agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the
parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement
in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is
offered. If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(A) or
(C), the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as
to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider
the presentence report. If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision
(e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that if the court does not accept
the recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to
withdraw his plea.
See United States v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1981) (within district court's discretion
to reject proposed guilty plea); United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1981) (trial
judge's rejection of a plea agreement under which defendant would have been sentenced to
probation was a proper use of discretion under FeD. R. Cium. P. 11(e)(1)); United States v.
American Bag & Paper, 609 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1979) (if government breaks its plea bargain,
the trial judge can choose to conform the sentence to the provisions of the bargain or to
allow withdrawal of the plea). See also Hoffman, Sentencing, supra note 24, at 325-29.
65. Deference to the sentencing judge means that we will rarely agree to drop counts
where doing so is likely to yield a possible restriction on what the judge may do. For exam-
ple, if all the factors in a case indicate that a judge might impose a total sentence of impris-
onment exceeding five years, the maximum punishment possible on a single count under a
number of federal statutes, we would demand at least a three count guilty plea, so that the
court can both impose a period of incarceration of whatever length it sees fit and also pro-
vide for a period of probation at the end of the defendant's prison term. See infra text
accompanying notes 67-69. Taking note of this fact, one judge in the Northern District of
Illinois recently issued an opinion in which he suggested that experience might well indicate
that defendants plead to every count of an indictment, rather than entering into plea agree-
ments where the government's agreement to dismiss counts promises a benefit to the defen-
dant that is marginal at best and perhaps even illusory. United States v. Vague, 521 F.
Supp. 147, 156 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Although the promise to dismiss counts is not often a major practical concession from the
government's viewpoint, many defense lawyers would argue that some absolute limitation on
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essarily limits the maximum sentence the court can impose.66
In order to avoid undue limitation of the court's sentencing
power, the United States Attorney's Office seldom agrees to a
guilty plea on only one count of an indictment in the interest of
deference to the district court.
In many cases district court judges impose a mixed sentence,e7
that is, a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation.
The federal probation statute, however, prohibits the incarceration
of a defendant for longer than six months on any single count on
which a sentence of probation has been imposed. 68 When the de-
fendant has pled guilty to only a single count, therefore, a court
may not be able to impose the precise mixed sentence it desires.
Instead, the judge may have to choose between imposing the pe-
the horizon of possible punishment is of significant psychological comfort to the guilty-
pleading defendant, who usually waits a month or two between the date of his guilty plea
and his sentencing. Moreover, the dropping of counts may also limit the collateral estoppel
effect of a guilty plea in any subsequent civil litigation dealing with the same course of
conduct. Finally, there are also occasional cases where the more severe charges in an indict-
ment are dropped as the result of plea negotiation with the guilty plea made to what are, in
essence, lesser offenses.66. See United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977) (since "the counts dis-
missed pursuant to plea bargains often carry heavier penalties than the counts for which a
guilty plea is entered, a plea bargain is an indirect effort to limit the sentencing power of the
judge"). See also Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, (Part I), 76 COLUM.
L. RRV. 1059, 1074, 1136-37 (1976).
67. See United States v. Cohen, 617 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hooper,
564 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1977).
See also STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 18-2.4(a)(ii) which provides:
Intermediate sanctions
(a) Attention should be directed to the development of a range of sentencing
alternatives which provide an intermediate sanction between supervised probation
on the one hand and commitment to a total custody institution on the other. Ex-
amples of the types of dispositions which might be authorized are:
(ii) commitment to an institution for a short, fixed term, followed by au-
tomatic release under supervision....
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provides in pertinent part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or
life imprisonment, if the maximum punishment provided for such offense is more
than six months, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United
States, when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as
well as the defendant will be served thereby, may impose a sentence in excess of
six months and provide that the defendant be confined in a jail-type institution or
a treatment institution for a period not exceeding six months and that the execu-
tion of the remainder of the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
best.
See also Hoffman, Sentencing, supra note 24, at 305-07.
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riod of imprisonment he believes appropriate without providing for
probation, or imposing a lesser period of confinement in order to
provide for probation.69 To prevent this dilemma, we try to avoid
one count pleas.
In addition to the dropping of counts, rule 11 also allows for ne-
gotiation and agreement concerning the government's sentencing
recommendation or the sentence itself. 70 Most plea agreements en-
tered into by the United States Attorney's Office are hybrid agree-
ments, because they obligate the government to move to dismiss
certain counts while binding us in some way with regard to our
position on sentencing.
Negotiated Advisory Recommendations
Rule 11(e)(1)(B) allows the government and the defendant to
enter into an agreement by which the government may specify in
the plea agreement either what its recommendation will be at the
time of sentencing, or that it will not oppose a sentencing recom-
mendation made by the defendant.71 These agreements are strictly
advisory to the court and do not bind the sentencing judge. 72 Even
69. See United States v. Hooper, 564 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1977) (reversal of district court's
imposition of a split sentence due to the nature of defendant's offense). See also United
States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Barbour, 554 F.2d 846 (8th
Cir. 1977).
70. FED. R. CrM. P. 11(e)(1)(B) and (C); STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 14-3.1(b)(i),
provides:
Propriety of plea discussions and plea agreements
(b) The prosecuting attorney, in reaching a plea agreement, may agree to one or
more of the following, as dictated by the circumstances of the individual case:
(i) to make or not to oppose favorable recommendations as to the sen-
tence which should be imposed if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere ...
But see In re Yieldings, 599 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1979) (judge not required to consider guilty
pleas under Rules 11(e)(1)(B) and (C)).
71. FED. R. Cumn. P. 11(e)(1)(B). See United States v. Henderson, 565 F.2d 1119 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145 (4th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Savage, 561 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1977). See also STANDARDS, supra
note 1, at § 14-3.1(b).
72. FED. R. Cium. P. 11(e)(1)(B). See United States v. Mooney, 654 F.2d 482 (7th Cir.
1981) (prosecutor's promise to recommend a 10 year sentence did not forbid a judge from
later imposing a 25 year sentence); United States v. Schmader, 650 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1981)
(imposition of sentence greater than that recommended by prosecutor does not constitute
rejection of plea agreement); Williams v. Morris, 633 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Incrovato, 611 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Gaertner, 593 F.2d 775 (7th Cir.
1979); United States v. Henderson, 565 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955
(1978); United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Savage, 561
F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1977) (where judge informs defendant that he has power to impose
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if the court does not agree to the proposed sentence, the defendant
may not freely withdraw the guilty plea.73 Agreements of this na-
ture make up the majority of the plea agreements into which we
enter. Negotiated advisory recommendations are typically made in
one of three forms: no recommendation, recommendation for a pe-
riod of incarceration, or recommendation for a substantial period
of incarceration.
1. No Recommendation
In the recent past, more than half of the plea agreements in
which the United States Attorney's Office has been engaged re-
quire the government to make no specific sentencing recommenda-
tion to the judge. A "no recommendation" agreement, however, is
not tantamount to a recommendation for probation. It simply
means that the equities in a particular case are not so clearly de-
fined as to compel a recommendation of incarceration. Our agree-
ment to make no recommendation frequently arises following a
guilty plea in less aggravated cases. In these cases, we agree essen-
tially to allow the facts to speak for themselves.
The government's no recommendation agreement regarding dis-
position is different from an agreement not to oppose a specific
sentencing recommendation made by the defendant. While the lat-
ter type of agreement is permitted under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,7 4 we seldom enter into one because of our re-
luctance to engage even indirectly in recommendations of a specific
sentence to the court.7 5 In contrast, our purpose in making no rec-
ommendation agreements is to remit the sentencing question solely
greater or lesser penalty than the one defendant bargained for, he may in fact impose a
different sentence without affording the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea).
But see United States v. White, 583 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1978) (after rejecting a nonbinding
sentencing recommendation made pursuant to a plea agreement, the district court thereby
rejected the plea agreement and defendant had to be afforded an opportunity to withdraw
the guilty plea).
73. FED. R. Cam. P. 11(e)(2). See United States v. Schmader, 650 F.2d 533 (4th Cir.
1981). But see United States v. White, 583 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1978).
Although we have spoken in the framework of plea agreements, the same basic regimen of
recommendations is followed in cases where the conviction is obtained by trial. The distinc-
tion, of course, is that there is no allowance in those cases in response to a defendant's guilty
plea.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Mooney, 654 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Gray, 611 F.2d 194, 199 (7th Cir. 1979).
75. On occasion, in the hard case that does not easily fit into any usual category, we
combine "no opposition" with one of our usual categorical recommendations, e.g., a recom-
mendation of incarceration with no opposition to work release.
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to the court's discretion, without indication from us of any position
regarding sentencing alternatives.
2. Recommendation for a Period of Incarceration
A recommendation for a period of incarceration reflects our
judgment that an offense, combined with pertinent variables, war-
rants some period of incarceration. Our support of a period of in-
carceration, as opposed to a substantial period,76 may indicate
some compromise on our part in recognition either of the defen-
dant's guilty plea or his cooperation. This recommendation may,
on the other hand, simply reflect our assessment of the relative
severity of the crime and the defendant's role in it.
Our decision to recommend a period of imprisonment is often
the matter discussed most heatedly with defense lawyers in the
course of plea negotiations. Although no factor by itself guarantees
that such a recommendation will or will not be made, some vari-
ables are more telling than others. Certainly a central considera-
tion is the nature of the offense. We commonly recommend a pe-
riod of incarceration for a specific group of offenses.77 In dealing
with other crimes, factors such as whether the criminal conduct
continued over a long period of time or was limited to a single epi-
sode are significant. In financial crimes, the actual monetary loss is
often important in measuring the gravity of the offense and thus
whether a prison sentence should be recommended.
Whatever the present offense, a past criminal record is a factor
that often suggests a recommendation of incarceration. The defen-
dant who has been convicted previously is from our perspective a
poor probation risk, because he has proven to be someone unde-
terred merely by the stigma of a criminal conviction and has shown
himself to be a continuing danger to the community.
3. Recommendation for a Substantial Period of Incarceration
A substantial incarceration recommendation is generally our of-
fice's most severe sentencing recommendation, although there are
isolated cases where the crime or the defendant's background are
so aggravated that we recommend the imposition of the maximum
sentence. The relative severity of a recommendation for a substan-
tial period of incarceration is often the product of plea negotia-
tions. The incentive to the defendant to plead guilty in face of this
76. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
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recommendation emanates from other concessions on our part,
such as a willingness to advise the court of his cooperation,7 8 or
from the defendant's own calculation that a guilty plea will in it-
self help to moderate his sentence.
We recommend a substantial period of incarceration for certain
offenses, or where factors counseling a recommendation of impris-
onment are present in an especially aggravated fashion. Examples
of the kinds of crime often treated with this recommendation in-
clude substantial breaches of public trust and narcotics offenses in-
volving pound quantities of drugs. A significant factor in our delib-
erations is the presence of an extensive criminal record. But again,
no single factor can control in all cases. The simplest formulation
of our approach is to say that this recommendation is used in cases
where concern for deterrence and community values demand sig-
nificant punishment.
Agreed Disposition
Rule 11's second option for sentencing disposition allows the de-
fendant and government, under rule 11(e)(1)(C), 7 9 to agree that a
specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case. If the
court accepts a rule 11(e)(1)(C) agreement, the agreement is bind-
ing on the court.80 On the other hand, if the court rejects the dis-
position agreed upon, the rule permits the defendant to freely
withdraw from the agreement.81
Our office approaches rule 11(e)(1)(C) agreed disposition pleas
with extreme caution for a number of reasons. First, plea agree-
ments of this type tend to intrude on the traditional sentencing
7S. See supra note 43.
79. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(1)(C) provides:
(e) Plea agreement procedure.
(1) In general. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the
defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions
with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related
offense, the attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of
the case.
80. United States v. Herrera, 640 F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1981) (where rule 11(e)(1)(C)
agreement has been made, the trial court "may accept or reject the whole agreement, but it
may not accept the defendant's guilty plea and impose a sentence greater than that agreed
upon"). Accord United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Seidman, 483 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
81. FED. R. Cram. P. 11(e)(1)(C).
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discretion of the district court judge."2 After receiving a plea agree-
ment, the judge may defer accepting or rejecting it until the
presentence report is reviewed.83 The report familiarizes the judge
with the case and allows the judge to determine whether the agree-
ment is consistent with his own view of the gravity of the offense.
Despite this opportunity for reflection, the fact that the parties
have approached the court with a joint decision as to how the case
should end means that the court is not writing on a blank slate
during its first consideration of the case. The judge may thus feel
constrained to accept the agreement, rather than force on both
sides a trial neither appears to want. A second reason for our cau-
tion is that these kinds of plea bargains lack a measure of finality
at the time the plea is given. If after examining the presentence
report the court does not agree with the parties' agreement, the
defendant may withdraw a guilty plea perhaps weeks after the
agreement was formed. Plea bargaining or preparation for trial
must then begin anew."
In spite of these drawbacks, we do on occasion engage in agreed
sentence pleas. Often this is in the face of exceptional circum-
stances, such as a defendant's cooperation that is so valuable that
we are obligated to offer the ultimate protection of an agreed sen-
tence. In addition, we will often arrive at an agreed disposition
plea in cases such as investigations of corruption in public agen-
cies, which yield a number of indictments and convictions for re-
lated, and often highly similar, conduct.85 In these situations, de-
fendants are often extremely reluctant to agree to plead guilty
without some assurance that the punishment imposed will meet a
82. See, e.g., United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1977).
83. FED. R. CriM. P. 11(e)(2); STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 18-6.4(a)(iv), which
provides:
Sentencing proceeding
(a) As soon as practicable after the determination of guilt and the examination
of any presentence reports (standards 18-5.1 to 18-5.6), a proceeding should be
held at which the sentencing court should:
(iv) in cases where guilt was determined by plea, inform itself, if not pre-
viously informed, of the existence of plea discussions or agreements and the
degree to which they involve recommendations as to the appropriate
sentence.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant refused to
plead guilty and instead went to trial after being informed by judge that she would not
accept defendant's and government's plea agreement but would impose a higher sentence).
85. 1979 REPORT, supra note 20, at 11-12 (describing the electrical inspector's investiga-
tion); 1980 REPoRT, supra note 9, at 9 (describing the Board of Appeals investigation).
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uniform standard.
Agreed disposition pleas, however, constitute a minority of the
plea agreements we enter into with defendants. By keeping to a
minimum the number of these pleas, we attempt to maximize the
district court judge's sentencing flexibility. Moreover, defendants
are often reluctant to enter into agreed sentence pleas, because
they prefer to appeal to the court's compassion rather than to that
of the prosecutor, who is, of course, an advocate with an advocate's
view of the case.
Recommendations Not Commonly Made
Our office seldom makes a sentencing recommendation of a spe-
cific term of years except in the occasional agreed disposition case
discussed previously.8 6 Although this is to a degree a matter of tra-
dition, this policy also reflects our continuing desire to show defer-
ence to the court and its sentencing deliberations. Judges who deal
with our office regularly can be expected to understand the sen-
tencing range we are suggesting in a particular case when one of
the negotiated advisory recommendations is made. To be more
specific in our recommendations is to impose unnecessarily upon
the court. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to our rare use of spe-
cific sentence recommendations. Occasionally, in cases in which we
believe that substantial incarceration is warranted, we will recom-
mend a specific prison term, due to a belief that the phrase "sub-
stantial incarceration" by itself may be too nebulous to give the
court a clear idea of our proposal. As an accommodation in the
course of plea negotiations, we will sometimes agree to recommend
that the sentence not exceed a specified period. This represents an
attempt to provide some measure of certainty to the pleading de-
fendant and again is often the result of compromise.
In accordance with our policy against making specific sentencing
recommendations, we also seldom recommend to the court that a
defendant be granted probation. Ordinarily, a probation recom-
mendation follows only in cases where the defendant is so ill that
incarceration is an entirely unforeseeable sentencing outcome, or
where the defendant's cooperation has been exceptional and his in-
volvement in the criminal conduct for which he was convicted is
minimal, particularly in relation to that of his collaborators.
Some of our reluctance to recommend probation undoubtedly
86. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
19821
Loyola University Law Journal
stems from a recognition that were our policy the reverse, proba-
tion would become the goal of the great majority of plea negotia-
tions from the defense perspective. This situation would lead to a
more complicated and time consuming plea negotiation process.
More important, however, is the fact that a government recom-
mendation for probation places the court in a most difficult situa-
tion, especially if the sentencing judge finds certain elements of the
case somehow aggravated. Given the care exercised in making the
decision to prosecute, we indict few cases in which at least a rea-
soned argument for a period of imprisonment in some form cannot
be made.
CONCLUSION
This article has described a variety of concerns bearing on a
prosecutor's sentencing recommendations. Matters of policy, which
reflect basic aspects of the prosecutorial function, have been dis-
cussed, as have certain aspects of the criminal justice system which
present systemic needs that can be served in some measure by sen-
tencing recommendations. The interaction of these factors in arriv-
ing at sentencing recommendations in the course of plea negotia-
tions has been described. Although none of the considerations
delineated amounts to a firm rule or even guidelines for the formu-
lation of sentencing recommendations, the article has sought to de-
scribe generally the process of deliberation in our office on these
questions.
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